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United States v. County of Westchester:
Invalidation of an Airport Curfew
I. Introduction
On August 24, 1983, United States District Court Judge
Robert J. Ward invalidated an airport curfew by granting per-
manent injunctive relief to the petitioner, United States of
America.1 The subject litigation, United States v. County of
Westchester,2 presents a plethora of substantive issues which
converge on a disturbing notion: the lack of autonomy which
may result when a municipality engages in a cooperative en-
terprise with a branch of the federal government.3
In United States v. County of Westchester, legislation 4
enacted by the defendant resulted in the institution of a cur-
few on all night flight operations at the county-owned West-
chester County Airport (Airport).5 The Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), along with other interested parties, 6
1. United States v. County of Westchester, 571 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
2. Id.
3. The federal agency involved in this case is the Federal Aviation
Administration.
4. On or about September 1, 1981, the Board of Legislators of Westchester
County passed Act 54-1981. Act 54-1981 amended the Rules and Regulations for the
Westchester County Airport by adding paragraph 29 to section 324 of said Rules. It
provides: "Implemented a mandatory curfew. No aircraft shall arrive or depart from
Westchester County Airport between the hours of 12:00 midnight and 7:00 a.m. ex-
cept in case of emergency."
5. The Airport is owned by the county. It provides services and facilities to per-
sons travelling in and engaged in interstate commerce. FAA operates and maintains
one air traffic control tower at the Airport, which is staffed by Federal air traffic
controllers. There are over 400 aircraft based at the Airport, approximately 275 to
350 of which are small propeller-driven and turboprop aircraft. The balance are busi-
ness jet aircraft. Air navigation equipment has been installed and is currently being
operated at the Airport by FAA pursuant to an agreement with the County. 571 F.
Supp. at 789-90.
6. The other petitioning parties were: a) the National Business Aircraft Associa-
tion (NBAA)- a New York corporation whose purpose is to protect and promote the
interests of member companies in the operation of their aircraft; b) the Aircraft Own-
1
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challenged the curfew on night operations, citing a variety of
legal bases. Judge Ward made extensive findings of fact' and
summarily concluded that permanent injunctive relief was the
appropriate judicial remedy.8 The court held that the county's
curfew on all night flight operations at the county airport
without regard to the accompanying noise level represented:
a) an undue burden on interstate commerce;9 b) an unreason-
able, arbitrary, discriminatory, and overbroad exercise of po-
lice power by the county;10 c) an improper intrusion by the
county into an area preempted by Congress;1" and d) a breach
by the county of the federal airport grant-in-aid program
under the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970.12
Section II of this Note analyzes the history of the curfew
at Westchester Airport and the past legal challenges made by
the surrounding localities in an attempt to retain a measure of
control in decisionmaking.15 Section III explores the amalgam
of decisions in the area with particular attention paid to the
landmark Supreme Court decision, City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal (Burbank)1 4 and its progeny. Section IV
considers the substantive legal bases of Judge Ward's deci-
sion, focusing on some underlying considerations that may not
have appeared in the formal opinion of the court. This Note
reaches the conclusion that a more comprehensive and defined
federal approach to the noise and aviation issues presented is
needed in order to guide subsequent judicial forays into the
field.
ers and Pilots Association- a New York corporation whose purpose is to promote and
protect the interests of owners and pilots of general aviation aircraft and c) Panorama
Flight Service, Inc.- a New York corporation whose principal place of business is the
Airport and which engages in the business of providing cargo and passenger air trans-
port services. Id. at 788.
7. Id. at 788-97.
8. Id. at 798.
9. Id. at 797.
10. Id. at 797-98.
11. Id. at 797.
12. Id. at 798.
13. Surrounding the Airport are the suburban communities of Harrison, Rye,
North Castle, Rye Brook, Port Chester, and Mount Pleasant, New York and Green-
wich, Connecticut. Id. at 791.
14. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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II. Background
A. Past Challenges to Expansion at the Airport
Westchester County Airport was built in 1942 as a patri-
otic response to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. 15 Since its in-
ception, the noise generated in the predominantly residential
area contiguous to the facility has given rise to three separate
instances of opposition to its continued expansion.
In 1956, the Airport attempted to expand its facilities
through a proposed $2.2 million master plan which included
the construction of a new terminal and runway. The proposi-
tion, however, was not approved by the residents of Westches-
ter and therefore was not implemented."6
With the advent of jet operations 17 at the Airport in the
1960's, the Airport's surrounding communities were con-
fronted with the problem of increasing noise. In response, sev-
eral grass roots organizations began to surface providing both
a forum for complaints as well as an organized means for dis-
sent."8 In 1968, the Town of Greenwich took an affirmative
stand against the proposed expansion of the Airport. At that
time, ten airline companies had submitted applications to the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to commence operations.
However, CAB concluded that two factors militated against
the granting of the requested licenses: the opposition aroused
on the local level and the lack of need for a fourth major New
York area airport.""
Finally, in 1974, a $20 million damage suit 0 was filed by
15. Greenwich Time, May 15, 1983, at A4, col. 3.
16. Id.
17. An aircraft "operation" is generally defined as either a landing or a take-off.
571 F. Supp. at 789.
18. For example, the Town of Greenwich presently has two separate citizen orga-
nizations. The first, the Airport Concern Team, was formed in 1981 and is a lobbying
group whose primary focus is opposition to expansion at the Airport. The second, Air
Conservation Trust, was also formed in 1981. It is a nonprofit, educational group of
about 400 homeowners and six civic organizations who collect, analyze, and dissemi-
nate information on airport-related issues. Greenwich Time, May 15, 1983, at A4, col.
2.
19. Id. at col. 3.
20. Town of Greenwich v. Westchester County, No. B-74-280 (D. Conn. July 29,
1974).
19841
3
86 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
the Town of Greenwich and others against Westchester
County over the noise issue. The suit was settled out of court
when the county agreed to join a negotiating committee that
would attempt to deal with the issues raised by the lawsuit.2"
B. The Curfew
The Westchester County Board of Legislators passed Act
54-1981 in September 1981, implementing the mandatory cur-
few at the Airport. The curfew prohibited the arrival or de-
parture on a non-emergency basis of any aircraft between the
hours of midnight and 7:00 a.m. It applied to all aircraft re-
gardless of the "noise emission level or degree of noise pro-
duced."22 Violation of the curfew was punishable by a fine not
to exceed $100.00 or by imprisonment not to exceed thirty
days, or both.2 3
C. Results of the Curfew
Prior to concluding that the curfew was invalid, the court
evaluated its effects. According to the court, the substantiated
results of the curfew were: delays in departures as a result of
the congestion and loss of efficiency;24 impaired contractual
relations between users of the Airport and its business cus-
tomers;25 and decreased flexibility and increased disruptions
of business and commercial travel and enterprise.2 6 The court
concluded that, "[fllights in and out of other airports are not
an adequate substitute for the flexibility provided by business
21. The committee made significant contributions to noise abatement at the Air-
port. It worked with owners and operators at the Airport to reduce touch-and-go op-
erations; restrict the use of reverse thrust, except in emergency conditions; initiate
higher flights around the Airport; reduce engine runups or maintenance tests on the
runway; and obtain noise complaint information through the installation of a noise
complaint telephone number. Further, the committee recommended noise abatement
flight procedures and a voluntary curfew at the Airport limiting takeoffs and landings
between the hours of 11:30 p.m. and 6:30 a.m. Information concerning the voluntary
curfew was disseminated by NBAA, FAA and the county. 571 F. Supp. at 791.
22. Id. at 794.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 796.
25. Id. at 796-97.
26. Id. at 797.
[Vol. 2
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and corporate air flights in and out of the Airport."'27 The
court also discussed the post-curfew noise data that had been
compiled.2 8 The conclusion of the court was that "the overall
pattern of findings did not support an inference of substantial
community reaction to the operational changes at HPN
[Westchester County Airport]."29
III. Curfews in Aviation Case Law
A. General Sources of Regulation
Like the law concerning other forms of pollution, the law
of noise is a combination of federal, state, and local regula-
tion.30 Federal noise regulation stems from the Noise Control
Act of 197231 which was patterned after the Clean Air Act.3 2
The Aviation Noise Abatement Policy (Policy) of 1976
presents an integrated format with individual plans for fed-
eral action, air carrier action, and some local action as well.
The Policy summarizes the legal framework regarding aircraft
and airport noise and provides: a) the federal government has
preempted the areas of air space use and management, air
traffic control, safety, and the regulation of aircraft noise at its
source; and b) other powers and authorities to control airport
noise rest with the airport proprietor - including the power to
27. Id.
28. Id. at 794-96. The county retained the services of the consulting firm of Bolt,
Beranek, and Newman to conduct a temporary noise monitoring program at the Air-
port. Essentially, this program was a joint endeavor between the parties in which they
agreed to hold a 60 day nighttime operation test period. During this period, data was
collected from permitted arrivals between midnight and 6:30 a.m. of aircraft that did
not exceed certain noise limits.
29. Id. at 794-95. Interestingly however, the opinion is devoid of any reference to
the experiences of the noise complaint hotline which operated at the Airport both
before and after the institution of the curfew. In the spring and summer of 1981,
monthly totals of phone calls to the Airport's complaint line rose from 174 in March
to a recorded high of 721 in June. Complaints plummeted after the curfew went into
effect in October. In the twelve months that followed, the Airport registered but 159
complaints! Greenwich Time, May 17, 1983, at A13, col. 4.
30. T. Schoenbaum, Environmental Policy Law 1049 (1982).
31. Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-
4918 (Supp. V 1982)).
32. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7642 (Supp. V 1982)).
5
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select an airport site, acquire land, assure compatible land
use, and control airport design, scheduling and operations -
subject only to Constitutional prohibitions against creation of
an undue burden on interstate and foreign commerce, unjust
discrimination, and interference with exclusive federal regula-
tory responsibilities over safety and air space management.3"
In 1978, the Quiet Communities Act3 was passed to en-
courage development of noise control programs on the state
and local levels.3 5 In addition, FAA issues noise limits for new
types of aircraft.36 The power of a state to generally regulate
its political subordinates, including local airport authorities, is
well established as a matter of law.3 7 Local regulation is gener-
ally implemented by the enactment of ordinances which es-
tablish maximum noise levels.3 8
The law of noise, therefore, is a collection of federal,
state, and local regulations, but a body of law that nonetheless
lacks integration. Even though the federal government has en-
tered the regulatory arena and technology is rapidly progress-
ing, the noise problem is far from solved.39 Land owners proxi-
mately located to busy and noisy airports generally are not
content to wait until science and the government can elimi-
nate the noise.' 0 Property owners have based past legal ac-
tions on a number of theories in an effort to alleviate the
33. U.S. Department of Transportation. Aviation Noise Abatement Policy 34
(Nov. 18, 1976). The policy also provides that the federal government has substantial
power to influence airport development through its administration of the Airport and
Airway Development Program. Further, the state and local governments may protect
their citizens through land use controls and other policy measures not affecting air-
craft operations.
34. 42 U.S.C. 4913 (Supp. V 1981).
35. Schoenbaum, supra note 30, at 1049.
36. Id.
37. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Transworld Airlines v.
City & County of San Francisco, 228 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
919 (1956); see generally Robinson, Environmental Regulation of Real Property 8-16
- 8-18 (1982).
38. Schoenbaum, supra note 30, at 1049; see generally Robinson, supra note 37,
at 8-18 - 8-23.
39. Note, Airports: Full of Sound and Fury and Conflicting Legal Views, 12
Transp. L.J. 325, 330-31 (1981-82).
40. Id.
[Vol. 2
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problem or to recover damages for living in noise-impacted
areas.
41
B. Pre-Burbank Curfew Cases
The curfew case law predating the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Burbank demonstrates the judicial vacillation between
the conflicting theories in the area. 2 In Allegheny Airlines v.
Village of Cedarhurst,43 a town ordinance which prohibited
planes from flying over Cedarhurst at an altitude of less than
1000 feet was challenged. The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit struck down the ordinance because the federal
government had preempted the field of air traffic regulation
under the Commerce Clause and because the ordinance was in
direct conflict with federal statutes and regulations.
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, s the
same court invalidated a town ordinance forbidding anyone
from operating a device (including aircraft) creating noise in
the town exceeding a certain ground decibel limit.46 The
court's decision, however, did not address the preemption is-
41. Id. at 331. Various legal theories have been advanced but the discussion of
them is beyond the scope of this Note. Briefly, these theories and representative cases
are: a) inverse condemnation/constitutional taking: see Griggs v. Allegheny County,
369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); b) trespass: see
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); In re Ramsey, 31 Pa. Commw. 182, 375
A.2d 886 (1977); c) nuisance: see Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc. 61
Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548 (1964); San Diego Unified Port Auth. District v. Superior
Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977);
Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329,
160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
42. See generally Note, supra note 39; Note, Aircraft Noise Abatement: Is there
Room for Local Regulation?, 60 Cornell L. Rev. 269 (1975); Muss, Aircraft Noise:
Federal Pre-Emption of Local Control, Concorde and Other Recent Cases, 43 J. Air
L. & Com. 753 (1977).
43. 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
44. Id. at 881.
45. 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), afl'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
46. A decibel is a unit for measuring the relative loudness of sounds equal ap-
proximately to the smallest degrees of difference of loudness ordinarily detectable by
the human ear, the range of which includes about 130 decibels on a scale beginning
with one for the faintest audible sound. Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary 585 (1976).
7
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sue but struck down the ordinance because it was in direct
conflict with federal law.
The California Supreme Court in Loma Portal Civic Club
v. American Airlines, Inc.4s declined to accept the theory of
complete federal preemption of the field of control of flight
operations. The court was not persuaded that a per se rule of
federal preemption was judicially sound and concluded that
"a holding of federal preemption would have the effect of dis-
abling the state from any action in the entire
field. .... (U)nless Congress had in fact intended such preclu-
sion of state regulation and were to carry out its responsibili-
ties, there would result within that state a lacuna which the
state would be powerless to fill."'4 9
The Loma Portal rationale was subsequently adopted by
a California lower court in Stagg v. Municipal Court.50 The
court noted that noise abatement is a federal as well as a state
objective. Furthermore, if the state regulation was not incon-
sistent with safety concerns, it would not necessarily present a
conflict with federal law, but might well reinforce it." There-
fore, the court concluded that reasonable regulations by a mu-
nicipality as to time, manner, and place of takeoff from its
airport, such as a curfew ordinance, were not inappropriate
since such regulations produce mere incidental effects rather
than an impairment of the right of flight.52
A similar result is present in Township of Hanover v.
Town of Morristown" in which a New Jersey court issued an
injunction requiring a jet curfew. The court noted that the
limitation of the hours of an airport's operation does not in-
47. State and local statutes can run afoul of the scheme of federal regulation in
two ways: a) by being in direct conflict with a federal statute in a field which the
Constitution has reserved for the federal government, and b) by having its entire
power to regulate in an area negated under the concept of preemption. Muss, supra
note 41, at 765.
48. 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548 (1964).
49. Id. at 591, 394 P.2d at 554.
50. 2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1969).
51. Id. at 321, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 580 (citing Loma Portal Civic Club v. American
Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 592, 394 P.2d 548, 554 (1964)).
52. Id. at 321, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
53. 108 N.J. Super. 461, 261 A.2d 692 (1969).
[Vol. 2
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volve the safety factors which are the primary concern of
FAA, and thus is a variable with which a court may concern
itself in devising a remedy for an airport noise problem.4
From this overview of pre-Burbank decisions, one can
readily discern the basic controversy whether local attempts
to deal with aircraft noise should be considered as presenting
a question of complete preemption or one of specific conflict
with federal law. However, the particular characterization was
not determinative because the results were generally the same
regardless of the rationale adopted. If a court did not adhere
to a total preemption rationale, an easily perceptible conflict
with FAA regulations would generally form the basis for inval-
idating local legislation or preventing state action which af-
fected flight paths and procedures. In fact, one of the few
types of local noise abatement measures which arguably could
withstand attack on the ground of conflict is the type of time
restriction ordinance which the Burbank court struck down on
the ground of preemption."6
C. The Burbank Decision
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.51 is the
leading case concerning the extent of federal preemption of
local governments' authority to regulate aircraft noise.5 7 In
this case, a group of private owners of an airport brought suit
against the city of Burbank, California, seeking an injunction
against a city ordinance which made it illegal for jets to take
off from Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11:30 p.m. and
7:00 a.m. In enacting the ordinance, the city was attempting
to avoid the Cedarhurst58 and Hempstead" pitfalls by limit-
54. The court thus found that since the federal legislation was designed to pro-
mote safety, its purpose would not conflict with local requirements designed to main-
tain community tranquility and welfare or protect local property interests. Id. at 478-
79, 261 A.2d at 701.
55. Note, Aircraft Noise Abatement: Is There Room for Local Regulation? 60
Cornell L. Rev. 269, 284 (1975).
56. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
57. Muss, supra note 41, at 779.
58. 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), afl'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
59. 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
1984]
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ing the hours of airport use instead of regulating the flights of
the aircraft themselves.6 Justice Douglas, writing for a five-
member majority of the Court, analyzed the regulatory and
legislative histories of the various federal statutes concerning
aviation and concluded that "(t)here is to be sure, no express
provision of pre-emption in the 1972 Act. That, however, is
not decisive. . . .It is the pervasive nature of the scheme of
federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to conclude
that there is pre-emption."'61 The majority's judgment was
that the Noise Control Act of 1972 "reaffirms and reinforces
the conclusion that the FAA, now in conjunction with EPA,
has full control over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and local
control. ',6'
In addition to finding preemption, the majority concluded
that, due to the pervasive nature of the federal regulation, a
demonstrable need for a uniform national rule in the area was
mandated in order to prevent obstruction of the purposes and
objectives of Congress underlying the Federal Aviation Act."
The Court concurred with the conclusion of the district court
that the imposition of curfew ordinances on a nationwide ba-
sis would result in the "bunching" of flights in the hours im-
mediately preceding or following the curfew and would, there-
fore, cause a loss of efficiency in the use of the airways, serve
to aggravate the noise problem, and decrease aviation safety."
Such a result, the court concluded, is "totally inconsistent
with the objectives of the federal statutory and regulatory
scheme."65 Therefore, stated succinctly, the Burbank decision
is precedent for the notion that FAA has full control over air-
craft noise, preempting state and local control. 6
denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
60. Note, supra note 39, at 338.
61. 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 639.
64. Id. at 627, 639.
65. Id. at 627-28.
66. However, the Court limited the preemption to the states' police power. Foot-
note 14 to the opinion states the distinction:
Airport owners "acting as proprietors" can presently deny the use of their
airports to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long as such exclu-
[Vol. 2
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Justice Rehnquist, in dissent,"' determined that there was
insufficient expression of congressional intent to infer preemp-
tion. He emphasized that states should not be precluded from
exercising their historic police powers "unless the requisite
pre-emptive intent is abundantly clear." s Justice Rehnquist's
analysis of the legislative history led him to conclude that
merely by allowing a municipality to regulate aircraft noise
through the use of its police power was not an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the purposes of Congress and thus, was
not preempted. 9
D. The Progeny of Burbank
Some courts, in the wake of Burbank, have utilized spe-
cific aspects of that opinion as a basis for decision, while other
courts have focused on the dissent. Some federal courts have
held that the effect of Burbank is to bar airport proprietors
from restricting the patterns, frequency, and scheduling of
flights, and to prohibit any limitation on the permissible types
of aircraft.70 Other courts, while agreeing that proprietors may
not regulate "aircraft," have held that airport operators do re-
tain responsibility for the proper construction, operation, and
maintenance of ground facilities, and for land use planning
designed to minimize the effects of noise.7 '
Several federal courts, supporting the FAA position, have
interpreted Burbank as recognizing the power of a proprietor
to impose airport use restrictions to the extent that they are
reasonable and nondiscriminatory.7 In two cases involving
sion is nondiscriminatory .... But, we are concerned here not with an ordi-
nance imposed by the City of Burbank as "proprietor" of the airport, but
with the exercise of police power .... Thus, authority that a municipality
may have as a landlord is not necessarily congruent with its police power.
Id. at 635-36.
67. Justices Stewart, Marshall, and White joined in the dissent.
68. 411 U.S. 624, 643 (1973).
69. Id. at 652.
70. Leudtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975); County of
Cook v. Priester, 22 Ill. App. 3d 964, 318 N.E.2d 327 (1974), aff'd, 62 Ill.2d 357, 342
N.E.2d 41 (1976).
71. E.g., Air Transp. Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
72. Schoenbaum, supra note 30, at 1054.
1984]
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flights of the Concorde supersonic transport (SST) airplane,
the second circuit concluded that New York City's John F.
Kennedy Airport may impose reasonable noise limitations,
even though the regulations might preclude the commence-
ment of SST service.7" A lower federal court in California has
upheld the right of a noncommercial municipal airport to im-
pose a Burbank-type curfew.74 Furthermore, the Burbank
opinion strongly suggests that any local noise or use restric-
tions, by whomever imposed, substantially upsetting current
air schedules or preventing the use of currently operational
commercial aircraft, would unacceptably burden both federal
aviation policy and interstate commerce.75
In United States v. State of New York,76 the federal gov-
ernment challenged a curfew at Republic Airport which the
state of New York had promulgated in response to local com-
munity complaints of noise pollution. The curfew, which is re-
markably similar to the curfew in United States v. Westches-
ter,77 was deemed to be a nullity by the reviewing court. The
asserted bases for the decision were: a) violation of the
Supremacy Clause in that even though Congress had not com-
pletely displaced state regulation in the area, the state enact-
ment is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with
federal law;78 and b) a violation of the Airport and Airways
Development Act of 1970 in that airports receiving federal
funding must be made available for use by the United States
at all hours.79
73. British Airways v. Port Auth. of New York, 564 F.2d 1002, 1011-13 (2d Cir.
1977); British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of New York, 558 F.2d 75, 82-85 (2d Cir.
1977).
74. National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417, 424-25 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
75. See generally Skillern, Environmental Protection: The Legal Framework,
285-88 (1981); Note supra note 54, at 286-88.
76. 552 F. Supp. 255 (N.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 708 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1907 (1984).
- 77. That is, a mandatory curfew prohibiting operations between the hours of
11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. Id. at 260.
78. Id. at 265.
79. Id.
[Vol. 2
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IV. Analysis
Judge Ward engaged in an extensive examination and
analysis of the factual issues and circumstances presented in
United States v. County of Westchester. His conclusions of
law, however, though supported by the cited precedents, do
not seem to satisfactorily address all the relevant arguments.
For example, the conclusion reached with regard to the pre-
emption issue is based exclusively on the Burbank holding.80
As a result of the limited presentation of contrary authority
by the county, Judge Ward made no attempt to undermine
the reservations of the Burbank dissenters but conclusorily
decided that state and local action were preempted. Certainly,
absent a contrary expression by the Court or Congress, Judge
Ward was not required to address the concerns of the Bur-
bank dissenters. Perhaps a more forceful argument could have
been presented by the defendant county as to the viability
and applicability of those aspects. Such a position would
seemingly be justified in light of the post-Burbank congres-
sional enactments which specifically returned a measure of
autonomy to states and local communities."'
Similarly, with regard to the lawfulness of the curfew and
the alleged burden on interstate commerce,8" Judge Ward
merely cites the landmark decisions in the area. Of particular
note is the reliance he placed on the factually similar case of
United States v. State of New York.83 That decision, how-
ever, is more properly analyzed in terms of economic effects
and the Contract Clause of the Constitution.8 4 In that case, a
prima facie case of contractual impairment was deemed to
have been presented. The petitioner had given notice that
should such a curfew be imposed and withstand scrutiny, its
customers would be left with no alternative but to relocate to
80. 571 F. Supp. at 797.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34. For a more extensive analysis of
the preemption issue, see generally: Note, supra note 54, at 274-88; Muss, supra note
56, at 765-70; Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context: A Uni-
fied Method of Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 197 (1978).
82. See supra note 74.
83. See supra note 75.
84. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
1984]
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another airport.8 5 In point of fact, the determinative element
which resulted in the curfew invalidation was that Republic
Airport had agreed to and received federal financial assistance
pursuant to the Airport and Airways Development Act of
1970. Among the Act's provisions is a requirement that, as a
condition to obtaining federal funding, an airport owner must
give assurances that "all of the facilities of the airport devel-
oped with federal financial assistance and all those usable for
landing and takeoff will be available to the United
States. . . .in common with other aircraft at all times."8
The identical circumstance is present in United States v.
County of Westchester and constitutes a major stumbling
block for the county enactment. Judge Ward concluded that
"(t)he curfew on flight operations at the Airport constitutes a
breach of the terms, conditions, and assurances set forth in
the grant-in-aid agreements between the county and FAA en-
tered into pursuant to the Airport and Airways Development
Act of 1970." As a result, FAA declined to provide further
grant-in-aid funds to the county for the Airport based on its
decision that the Airport, by enacting the curfew, had failed
to comply with the terms, conditions, and assurances set forth
in the existing grant agreements."
Another aspect which failed to appear in the court's for-
mal opinion is the proposed "reconstruction" of the facility
under review. A so-called "master plan" is in the process of
implementation.8 9 The master plan is a blueprint for a major
overhaul at the Airport. The comprehensive plan is a $51.2
million rebuilding program, including $31.6 million to be fi-
nanced by federal, state, and county taxes.90 The proposed ex-
pansion is to commence in the spring of 1984 and continue for
85. 552 F. Supp. 255, 261 (N.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 708 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1907 (1984).
86. 49 U.S.C. 2 2 10(a)(6) (1982), emphasis added.
87. 571 F. Supp. at 798.
88. Id. at 791.
89. For a thorough analysis of the master plan and its implications, see a five
part series on the topic written by Michael Hart which appears in the Greenwich
Time commencing May 15, 1983.
90. The remaining $19.6 million is envisioned as coming from the private sector.
Greenwich Time, May 15, 1983, at A4, col. 2.
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seven years.9 1 The necessity for continual federal aid via the
Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970 becomes more
apparent once the county's reorganization plans for the Air-
port are disclosed. The subtle yet thoroughly critical interplay
of these economic considerations however failed to appear in
the analysis of the court.
A final important variable which was only briefly alluded
to in the opinion was the county's failure to engage in any
systematic quantification of the nature or extent of a noise
problem at the Airport prior to the passage of the curfew.
Similarly, the county did not perform any studies prior to en-
actment indicating that the proposed legislation would specifi-
cally address the needs of the residents of the communities in
and around the Airport.92 Certainly, the failure to fully ex-
plore all aspects of the noise problem must have been a per-
suasive factor in the court's conclusion that the curfew was an
unreasonable, arbitrary, and overbroad enactment.
V. Conclusion
Westchester County Airport is a facility serving general
aviation, a number of corporate jets, and a limited number of
scheduled airlines. At the behest of citizen groups who com-
plained that the quiet enjoyment of their homes was denied
by such operations, the local government decided to enter the
arena. The result was a blanket curfew which closed the air-
port to all aircraft during the nighttime hours without regard
to the environmental impact of generated noise. Some noise
reduction was achieved, 93 but the curfew also engendered a
significant "bunching" of flights causing delays and reducing
overall safety.9 4 Thus, the action taken by the local govern-
91. Id. The primary aspects of the "master plan" are: a) increasing the capacity
of the Airport to handle as many as 350,000 takeoffs and landings a year; b) increas-
ing the Airport's parking areas from a current 387 spaces to more than 1200 spaces; c)
increasing the Airport's terminal space from 9890 square feet to as much as 46,000
square feet; and d) increasing the space for commercial airline carriers. Id. at A5, col.
1.
92. 571 F. Supp. at 798.
93. See supra text accompanying note 29.
94. In addition to the overall effect on aviation safety, other disbenefits of a cur-
1984]
15
98 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
ment did not result in a significant improvement in the noise
situation; it did, however, adversely affect air transportation.'
At present, FAA employs two primary mechanisms to
protect what it considers to be vital cogs in the air transporta-
tion system. One such device is litigation. The various legal
theories employable in the realm are demonstrably apparent
in the case at issue: a) the subject legislation may be deemed
to impose an undue burden on commerce; b) a noise standard
may interfere with a federally preempted authority to regulate
the safe and efficient use of airports; c) an airport restriction
may unreasonably discriminate among users; d) the limitation
may violate the terms of federal airport grants."
The other technique used by FAA to exact compliance is
the conditioning of grants. When FAA provides airport devel-
opment funds, that money is conditioned upon certain assur-
ances from the airport operator. Breach of the agreements re-
sults in the use of the other remedy, litigation.
On another front, the legal theories in noise litigation
have been judicially expanded so as to warrant recovery for
noise-related effects under a nuisance theory for emotional
distress, as well as under the traditional inverse condemnation
theory for deprivation of property.97 In an effort to avoid pos-
sible lawsuits and decrease objectionable noise levels, airport
proprietors and municipality non-proprietors are implement-
ing airport use restrictions. 8 Until FAA undertakes to draft
comprehensive regulations which balance the need for some
degree of local autonomy, the need for a viable and safe air
transportation system, and the environmental as well as eco-
nomic considerations at stake, the judiciary will continue to
be the final arbiter in an area replete with countervailing con-
few generally are "bunching," increased air congestion, delays, noise during daylight
hours, inefficient utilization of aircraft and ground equipment, and a corresponding
increase in operating costs and fares. Muss, supra note 41, at 788, n.173.
95. Helms, Noise Pollution and Airport Regulation, 47 J. Air L. & Com. 405, 410
(1982).
96. Id. at 411.
97. Bennett, Airport Noise Litigation: Case Law Review, 47 J. Air L. & Com.
449, 488-89 (1982).
98. Id.
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siderations. For this reason, this area of environmental law
mandates cooperation between state and federal governments
and demands as much clarification concerning requirements
and standards as Congress or the state legislatures can
provide.99
Mark H. Henderson
99. Skilern, supra note 74, at 287.
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